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NOTES
being within the provisions of the statute prohibiting implied covenants.
Assuming that it is to the advantage of the oil and gas interests in
Wyoming to be assured of the status of the doctrine of implied covenants,
and still have the judicial definition as to the nature of an oil and gas
lease remain unchanged, the solution may be found by examination of
statutory provisions of other states. Some states25 have solved the problem
of implied covenants by expressly providing for protection of the lessor
through statutory enactment. An example of such legislation is illustrated
by Arizona. It has provided an administrative remedy for the landowner
in which a state commissioner is given the power to prescribe and enforce
rules and regulations governing the drilling, casing, and abandonment of
oil and gas wells, as well as being empowered to forfeit leases for the failure
of the lessee to develop the tract within six months after the lease, if it is
determined that there is oil and gas in paying quantities. 28 The simplest
solution would be the method employed by the Michigan legislature when
it realized that its statute, 27 reading the same as Wyoming's statute excluding implied covenants, would be a bar to implied covenants in oil and
gas leases. The legislature simply amended the statute, adding the words,
"except oil and gas leases," thus preserving the judicial definition of the
interest created by an oil and gas lease, and availing the doctrine of implied
covenants to the oil and gas lessor of that state. 28 In this same manner,
any doubt as to the status of the implied covenant or the interest created
by the oil and gas lease in Wyoming could be easily resolved.
THOMAS W.

RAE

NO SURVIVORSHIP FROM JOINT TENANCY OF
SAFE DEPOSIT BOX
The case of Hartt v. Brimmer' presented for the first time in Wyoming a fact situation calling for a decision of the effect of a joint tenancy
of a safe deposit box upon ownership of the contents. That case involved
the question of the ownership of valuable stock certificates contained in
a safe deposit box. The deceased had been sole lessee of the box, and
about nine months after he had made out his will, his wife became colessee of the box. The contract with the bank contained the following
provision: "As joint tenants with right of survivorship and not as tenants
in common." After the husband's death, the wife claimed to be the sole
owner of the property in the box because of the survivorship clause in the
contract. The executors of the estate contended that there could be no
25.
26.
27.
28.
1.

Burns Annotated Ind. Stat., § 4859 (1934); Ky. Rev. Stat., § 353.040 (1948); Ariz.
Rev. Code, §§ 2493, 2495 (1928).
See note 25, supra.
See note 14, supra.
Mich. Comp. Laws, § 565.5 (1948).
Hartt v. Brimmer,

-

Wyo.

___ 287 P.2d 638 (1955).
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joint tenancy with an accompanying right of survivorship unless the four
common law unities of time, title, interest, and possession were present.
The court held that the wife was a joint tenant in the deposit box but
not in the contents. It did not determine the contention of the executors,
and as a result, the case left two problems unresolved as to such a situation.
The first is whether the four unities are necessary to create a joint tenancy
in the property in the deposit box, and the second is what evidence will be
conclusive to establish the joint tenancy.
In discussing these problems, it is desirable to have a general understanding of the history of joint tenancies. At common law joint tenancies
2
were favored by the courts, but today tenancies in common are presumed.
The reason for the change stems from the fact that one of the main incidents of a joint tenancy is the right of survivorship, and this feature of
survivorship does not accompany a tenancy in common. The courts believe that the survivorship has been unwittingly attached to property by
the creation of joint tenancies, thereby cutting off the heirs, and to get
away from what many times produces an unjust result, the courts carefully
scrutinize the evidence to determine whether the parties actually intended
3
to set up a joint tenancy.
Keeping in mind this brief background of the attitude of the courts
toward survivorship, an examination of the cases confronted with problems
similar to those presented in the Hartt case is in order. If the deposit
agreement specifically states that the contents of he box shall be joint
4
property, the overwhelming majority of cases have permitted survivorship.
In these cases the problem was whether the parties could by agreement
fasten survivorship to effects kept in a safe deposit box. Some of the cases
have indicated that the agreement itself is conclusive on the issue of survivorship, 5 while other cases have sustained the joint tenancy when the
facts showed nothing to rebut the agreement. 6 However, even when the
contract refers to ownership of the contents, a few cases have denied survivorship because of evidence tending to show that no survivorship was
intended. 7 In one case the joint tenancy was disallowed because a paper
written by the decedent found in the box stated that the property found
therein was to be distributed among three parties including the co-lessee
of the box.8 Another case would not allow survivorship because evidence
showed that the property was purchased solely by one of the parties, and
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

In re Hutchinson's Estate, 120 Ohio St. 542, 166 N.E. 687 (1929); Murray v. Gadsden,
91 U.S. App. D.C. 38, 197 F.2d 194 (1952).
In re Jirovec, 285 Ill. App. 499, 2 N.E.2d 354 (1936).
Young v. Young, 126 Cal. App. 306, 14 P.2d 580 (1932); Brown v. Navarre, 64 Ariz.
262, 169 P.2d 85 (1945) ; re Kosester's Estate, 286 Ill. App. 113, 3 N.E.2d 102 (1936);
re Gaines's Estate, 15 Cal.2d 255, 100 P.2d 1055 (1940).
Young v. Young, 126 Cal. App. 306, 14 P.2d 580 (1932); re Gaines's Estate, 15
Cal.2d 255, 100 P.2d 1055 (1940).
Brown v. Navaree, 64 Ariz. 262, 169 P.2d 85 (1946); re Koester's Estate, 286 111. App.
113, 3 N.E.2d 102 (1936).
Black v. Black, 199 Ark. 609, 135 S.W.2d 837 (1940); Clevidence v. Mercantile
Home Bank & Trust Co., 355 Mo. 904, 199 S.W.2d 1 (1947).
Black v. Black, 199 Ark. 609, 135 S.W.2d 837 (1940).
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there was no evidence to show a gift.9 Two conclusions can be drawn from
these cases. One is that the courts were not concerned with the requirement of four unities. Even the cases that denied survivorship, did so on
the basis of evidence rebutting the agreement rather than a lack of the four
unities. Another conclusion is that although an agreement referring to the
contents may not always be conclusive, it is very good evidence to create a
right of survivorship. It should also be pointed out that the court in the
Hartt case approved the rule that a joint tenancy in contents could be
created by express agreement. 10
When the leasing agreement does not specifically refer to the ownership of the property in the box, the cases seem to be in hopeless conflict
concerning the evidence the courts consider in determining whether there
is a right of survivorship. The clear majority of courts construe the agreement to mean only that the parties jointly leased the box, and the leasing
In many of the cases, shared
agreement has no effect on the contents."
role.' 2 Apparently joint
important
use of the box did not play a very
tenancy in the box is just a factor to show unity of possession, when the
four unities are required in a particular jurisdiction. Courts in denying
survivorship pay attention to failure to prove delivery when ownership is
based on a gift theory.' 3 Other cases have held that physical delivery
to the donee, and the subsequent placing of the contents in the deposit box
by the donee was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of delivery.'

4

This

problem of delivery has never been adequately solved by the courts. The
deposit of contents in a place as available to the donor as to the donee is
at least as consistent with non-delivery as with delivery. At least one court
court refused survivorship because the donor still had a key to the deposit
box.' 5 However, in other cases the fact that the donor had a key did not
upset the gift.' 6 To be absolutely safe, one donor gave both keys to the
donee.17
The declarations of decedent concerning his intent in placing contents
in a safe deposit box are important considerations, but usually not con9.
10.
11.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Clevidence v. Mercantile Home Bank & Trust Co., 355 Mo. 904, 199 S.W.2d 1
(1947).
Hartt v. Brimmer, ____ Wyo. __ 287 P.2d 638 (1955).
In re Bauernschmidt's Estate, 97 Md. 35, 54 At!. 637 (1903); re Brown, 86 Misc.
187, 149 N.Y.S. 138 (1914); Wohleber's Estate, 320 Pa. 83, 181 At!. 479 (1935);
Millman v. Streeter, 66 R.I. 341, 19 A.2d 254 (1941) ; Richard v. Richard, 141 N.J.
Eq. 579, 58 A.2d 544 (1948); In re Dean's Estate, 68 Cal. App.2d 186, 155 P.2d 901
(1945).
Trautz v. Lemp, 329 Mo. 580, 46 S.W.2d 135 (1932) ; re Wilson's Estate, 404 Ill.
207, 88 N.E.2d 662 (1949); In re Squibb's Estate, 95 Misc. 475, 160 N.Y.S. 826 (1916).
Trautz v. Lemp, 329 Mo. 580, 46 S.W.2d 135 (1932) ; Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co.,
132 Ohio St. 21, 4 N.E.2d 917 (1936); Taylor v. Taylor, 292 Mich. 95, 290 N.W.
341 (1940).
Beaumont v. Beaumont, C.A.3d N.J., 152 F. 55 (1907); Wakefield v. Wakefield, 37
Cal. App.2d 648, 99 P.2d 1105 (1940).
In re Bauernschmidt's Estate, 97 Md. 35, 54 Atl. 637 (1903).
Reeves v. Lyon, 224 Iowa 659, 277 N.W. 749 (1938); Beaumont v. Beaumont, C.A.3d
N.J., 152 F. 55 (1907).
Graham v. Barnes, 259 Mass. 534, 156 N.E. 865 (1927).
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trolling.' 8 However, one case did allow survivorship seemingly based entirely on a statement of deceased that his wife was to have the property in
the event of his death.1 9 A few courts will not admit declarations of the
deceased, 20 but from the type of evidence considered in the safe deposit
box cases, it is clear that parol evidence is generally admissible to show
the intention of the parties. Apparently the parol evidence rule presents
no problem in Wyoming, for oral evidence was admitted in the Hartt
21
case to determine intention.
Actually a prime consideration seems to be the specific items of
property in the deposit box. When the contents consist of money, the
courts are reluctant to allow survivorship, even when statements written
by the decedents found in the boxes indicate that the money belongs to
the survivors. 22 Indicia of ownership and change of ownership, such as
the registration of stocks and bonds and their indorsement in blank have a
great effect. Where bearer bonds are involved, 23 or where the bonds are
purchased by the deceased solely in his name, 24 survivorship is usually
denied. If the donor reserves the income from bonds, this is not inconsistent with a gift, and if the donee receives the income, it gives strength
to his claim.2 5 The courts are more disposed to allow survivorship in
registered bonds, when the bonds are payable in the alternative.2 6 This
attitude is in line with the majority rule concerning United States bonds,
which sustains survivorship when the bonds are registered in the names of
two individuals in the alternative. 27 The fact that the bonds are purchased solely with the funds of the deceased co-owner does not affect the
right of the surviving co-owner to sole ownership. 28
Conflicting holdings have been the rule when stock certificates have
been the res in the deposit box. If the certificates are in the name of only
the deceased, survivorship is usually denied. 29 However, if the certificates
are in an envelope with the survivor's name on it, many courts permit survivorship even though only the deceased's name appears on the certificate
itself.30 In the Hartt case survivorship was denied partly because the
18.
19
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

30.

Gilkinson v. Third Ave. R. Co., 47 App. Div. 472, 63 N.Y.S. 792 (1900); Albrecht
v. Slater, 289 Mo. 352, 233 S.W. 8 (1921).
Lilly v. Schmock, 297 Mich. 513, 298 N.W. 116 (1941).
California Trust Co. v. Bennett, 33 Cal.2d 694, 204 P.2d 324 (1949).
Hartt v. Brimmer, ____ Wyo. .__
287 P.2d 638 (1955).
Taylor v. Taylor, 292 Mich. 95, 290 N.W. 341 (1940); re Wilson's Estate, 404 111.
207, 88 N.E.2d 662 (1949); re Bashford's Estate, 178 Misc. 648, 34 N.Y.S.2d 678
(1942).
Re Wilson's Estate, 404 Ill. 207, 88 N.E.2d 662 (1949); re Brown, 86 Misc. 187,
149 N.Y.S. 138 (1914).
Wohleber's Estate, 320 Pa. 83, 181 Atl. 479 (1935); Clevidence v. Mercantile Home
Bank & Trust Co., 355 Mo. 904, 199 S.W.2d 1 (1947).
Beaumont v. Beaumont, CA.3d N.J., 152 F. 55 (1907).
Reeves v. Lyon, 224 Iowa 659, 277 N.W. 749 (1938); re Wilson's Estate, 404 Ill.
207, 88 N.E.2d 662 (1949); Stephens v. First National Bank of Nevada, 65 Nev.
352, 196 P.2d 756 (1948).
Lee v. Anderson, 70 Ariz. 208, 218 P.2d 732 (1950); Lemon v. Foulston, 169 Kan.
372, 219 P.2d 388 (1950).
Lemon v. Foulston, 169 Kan. 372, 219 P.2d 388 (1950).
In re Bauernschmidt's Estate, 97 Md. 35, 54 Atl. 637 (1903) ; Bolles v. Toledo Trust
Co., 132 Ohio St. 21, 4 N.E.2d 917 (1936).

Wakefield v. Wakefield, 37 Cal. App.2d 648, 99 P.2d 1105 (1940).
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certificates were solely in deceased's name.8 ' The court reasoned that if
a joint tenancy were intended, the deceased could easily have indorsed the
certificates. Survivorship has been allowed when indicia of ownership is
clearly shown by making out the certificates in the names of two individuals
as joint tenants.3 2 However, in one case the deceased continued to vote
the stock by himself, and on this ground survivorship was not allowed.8 3
Concerning the four unities, most of the cases sustaining survivorship
did so even though one or more of the unities were lacking. 4 It is apparent
that when survivorship is based on a joint tenancy created by a gift of a
partial interest, the requirement of four unities cannot be met. Even in
the cases denying survivorship, lack of the unities was not the basis for
the holdings.3 5 In one case an attempted transfer of stock originally owned
by one of the parties into a joint tenancy was disallowed, because the
property lacked the unities of time and title.3 6 The court suggested that
the stock should have been transferred to a straw-man and then back to
the parties in joint tenancy. To satisfy the requirements of unity, one
owner of stock surrended his certificates and had new ones issued to him
and his wife as joint tenants. 37 It might be well to note that a Wyoming
case involving a joint bank account permitted survivorship although the
unities apparently were not present. 38 However, the question of whether
the four unities are required was not an issue in the case.
It was not the purpose of this article to devise any clearcut method of
creating a right of survivorship in the contents of a safe deposit box. However, from the cases a few general observations can be made, which may
help to avoid some of the various pitfalls connected with the problem of
survivorship. In constructing the deposit box agreement, a reference
should be made to the effect that the contents are held in joint tenancy.
This is particularly important if the box contains money or chattels. If
the property consists of stocks or bonds, the certificates should specify
that the parties hold as joint tenants. This appears to be almost conclusive evidence of survivorship. When survivorship is based on a gift
theory, physical delivery to the donee is suggested. Possession of all keys
by the donee is desirable, if the circumstanecs will permit. Conveyance of
the articles to a straw-man and reconveyance to the parties is advisable
to satisfy the unities requirement. If the suggestions mentioned which
apply to a given situation are followed, the probabilities are that a right
of survivorship will be upheld.
THOMAS C. BOGUS
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